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Abstract
Research has demonstrated that lnfornatlon which is inconsistent 
with an expectancy is processed aore extensively than is consistent or 
irrelevant information. This research, along with some relevant models 
of person memory, is reviewed and the relationships between the research 
and these models are discussed. The models are limited in their 
applicability, however, since their supporting research has focussed 
exlusively on general expectancies. Consequently, there are no existing 
models of person memory that can account for expectancies which are 
specific to a particular situation. The present study found that 
situation-specific expectancies not only exist, but that recall patterns 
for these expectancies are markedly different from those associated with 
general expectancies. Since previous theories can not account for these 
results, a new model is proposed to specify how social information is 
organised in memory relative to situation-specific expectancies.
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For years, social psychologists have bsan interested in the way 
we process information about other people* Unfortunately, social 
information is so complex that it Is difficult to study without 
using an approach in which different variables are systematically 
manipulated In a series of experiments* In fact, recent progress in 
this area is due largely to the use of so called "cognitive" 
methodology la the area of soclaj. psychology. The outcome of this 
combination is an area commonly refered to as person memory.
The most useful approach of psychologists in the area of person 
memory is to assert a model, derive predictions from it, and test 
the predictions. These models have usually been of the associative 
network variety and have some common characteristics. They assume 
that Information which has been encoded into long term memory is 
organised in a particular way. This organisation can be represented 
by idea nodes and associative links which connect the idea nodes.
One question that Is frequently discussed when dealing with 
theories of memory concerns the relative memorability of information 
that is congruent, irrelevant, or incongruent with reference to a 
schema. If m  think of a general schema as the hypothesis of a given 
person about the world, and an event as data, the data and the 
hypothesis can have three relationships. These are congruency (the 
data fits the hypothesis), incongruency (the data is contradictory 
to the hypothesis), or irrelevancy (the data does not provide any 
information about the hypothesis). A more precise way of thinking 
about these terms is on a probability continuum relating the 
hypothesis to the data P(data/hypothesis). If the probability is
High/ the data is congruent with the hypothesis; when it is ion the 
date is incongruent with the hypothesis, and when the probability is 
in the aiddle range (near 0.5) the data is irrelevant to the 
hypothesis (Hastle, 1981).
Anderson and Bower (1984) proposed an associative network 
■eaory theory in which each proposition is treated as an Independent 
fact which does not In any way need to be integrated with other 
known facts. Thus, there is no Meaningful difference between the way 
in which congruent and incongruent behaviors are processed, and both 
would be expected to be recalled with equal likelihood.
An elaborate set of experlaents by Hastle and Kumar (1979) 
exaained eeaory for inforaation that was congruent or Incongruent 
with an expectancy. Subjects were told that they would be asked to 
fora iapresslons and recall Inforaation about fictional characters. 
They were also given expectancies about a target person. For 
exaaple, a subject night be told that the target person was 
"intelligent11 and then exposed tu a list of behaviors that are 
either congruent (e.g. "won the chess tournaaent"), irrelevant (e.g. 
"ordered a cheeseburger for lunch"), or Incongruent (e.g. "made the 
sane Mistake three tiaes") with the expectancy. Hastie found that 
recall of incongruent itens is consistently superior to recall of 
items congruent with the expectancy, and these in turn are better 
recalled than irrelevant items. Several variables have reliable 
effects on this relationship. When there are equal numbers of 
congruent and incongruent behaviors in the presentation list, there 
is a small but reliable advantage for incongruent over congruent
behaviors. As the att size for ineongruent behaviors is reduced 
relative to the set size for congruent behaviors, the proportion of 
ineongruent behaviors recalled increases, while the proportion of 
oongruent behaviors recalled does not depend on its set else. Haatie 
did not examine the case in which the set size for items ineongruent 
with the initial expectancy la greater than that for iteii congruent 
with the expectancy.
in another experiment (Haatie and Mazur, 1980), the set size 
variable was varied in conjunction with a level of Incongruence 
variable. The set size factor occurred at three levels: 9 congruent 
behaviors and 1 ineongruent, 7 congruent behaviors and 3 
ineongruent, 5 congruent and 5 ineongruent (equal set sizes). In a 
pretest, subjects rated behaviors on their incongruency with a given 
trait. Three types of ineongruent behaviors could be presented: (a) 
high-Incongruence behaviors; (b) medium -incongruence behaviors; and 
(c) low-Incongruence behaviors. Subjects viewed films of actors 
performing the behaviors. The results in the high-incongruence 
condition replicated those described in the Hastie and Kumar (1979) 
experiment. However, there was no significant difference between 
recall of congruent and ineongruent items in the equal set size 
condition. In the medium-incongruence condition, congruent item 
recall, as in the previous condition showed no set size dependence. 
Unlike the previous condition, however, ineongruent items in this 
condition also showed little influence of set size. The results of 
the low-incongruence condition were consistent with traditional 
schema theory as proposed by Bartlett (1932). In this condition, the
congruent behaviors were recalled batter than the incongruent 
behaviors.
One possible reason for these results Is that 
lower-incongruence items may be more irrelevant than 
higfe-lmeongrueiice Items. In fact Hastie gives an example of 
behaviors that represent the three different conditions. If the 
trait is friendly, three behaviors could be (a) '’hostile” (high 
incongruence); (b) "stupid” (medium incongruence) or (c) 
"intelligent” (low-Incongruence}. It seems as though "stupid”, and 
especially "intelligent”, are much more irrelevant to "friendly" 
than is "hostile”.
In a subsequent set of experiments, Anderson and Hastie (1980) 
explored the relative rates of forgetting of congruent and 
incongruent behavior descriptions with the same method that was 
described for the other experiments, they used both filmed and 
sentence materials with each subject viewing 16 behavior 
descriptions attributed to a single character. Each list of 
behaviors was preceded by a trait ensemble and followed by a 
retention interval before the recall test. These intervals, the 
major independent variable in the studies, ranged from 5 minutes to 
2 weeks. High, medium and low-incongruence behaviors (as defined in 
the previous experiment) were used. Recall of low and 
medium-incongruence items were unstable so only high-incongruence 
items will be discused. It was found that there was no differential 
forgetting of congruent and high-incongruent items. Initial 
differences in recall (high-incongruent events better recalled than
1congruent events) art preserved aliost perfectly at all delays, 
Furthermore, this worked when filas and behavior statements were 
used*
In sun, the results of the previous experiments indicate the 
following: (a) better recall of incongruent items than congruent 
itess, (b) a set size effect for recall of incongruent liens, but 
not for recall of congruent itens, and (c) differences in recall of 
congruent and incongruent itens are preserved over line.
Hastie»s Associative network Hodel
The model proposed by Anderson and Sower (HAM) can not explain 
the differences in recall of congruent and incongruent itens nor the 
absence of a set size effect for the congruent itens. Consequently,
« new nodel was proposed by Hastle (Hastie and Kumar, 1979) in which 
it was assuaed that incongruent itens are sore informative then 
congruent iteaa and that Informative itens are subjected to a ismpmr 
level of processing than less informative items, Since incongruent 
items aio more deeply encoded they are less susceptible to 
interference or decay during the retention period. Finally, deeply 
encoded acts are retrieved more easily than other acts during 
recall. The nature of this processing is such that deep encoding 
Involves the establishment of more interbehavior links than shallow 
encoding. Thus, an informative, incongruent act will be linked to 
more other behaviors than a relatively uninformative congruent act. 
Retrieval, as in the HAM model, would be a random search along the 
paths through the memory structure. Clearly, the more paths that are 
connected to a particular behavior, the higher the probability of
§recall, therefore, since incongruent itees have tore paths connected 
to thee then congruent iteas do, they have e higher probability of 
being recalled then congruent iteas (see figure t).
Insert Figure 1 about here
A series of eiperiaents, perforaed by Srull provide
strong support for Hestie's sodel. the first eepariaant tested a 
nueber of variables. A 3 * 3 * 2 x 2  coaplebely balanced factorial 
wui used, the factors were type of target (individual vs. Meaningful 
group vs. nonaeanlngful group), set slae (equal nuaber* of congruent 
and incongruent iteas vs. sore congruent than incon«truent l tees vs. 
fewer congruent than incongruent iteas), learning conditions (aeaory 
set vs. iapression set), and length of delay before recall 
(iaaedltte vs. AS hours). Half the subjects in each cell were told 
the target mis "friendly and sociable" and the other half sere told 
the target mis "unfriendly and nonsociable" (they received identical 
iteas).
the subjects in tne starry set -unditton ware told to reeeeber 
the behavioral tr forest ids as well a* puss lb le and that they would 
later be ashed to recall it* basic the subject* In the
Iapression set oonditii.n were i .1 % m x they u *rm m
Iapression of what the n M ■*•'1 ltfc* m m  Kmt
would later be * m m  '<■ ease *■•«* '’megiNWMM * *ha iers?n
f or group i
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Subjects in the Individual target condition were told that each 
of the behaviors had been manifested by a particular individual 
named Peter Lacy, while subjects in the group target conditions were 
told that eaflh behavior presented had been manifested by a different 
member of the group. Each behavior presented was associated with a 
different male name. Subjects In the meaningful group target 
condition were given the same information as the subjects in the 
non-meaningful group condition, except that they were also told that 
this group is a real one, composed of a political caucus of a 
mldwestern state who are meeting regularly in order to select 
delegates to the upcoming national political convention, la 
contrast, subjects in the non-meaningful group target condition were 
not given any reason to believe that the members of the group 
interacted. Thus, they had little reason to try and understand the 
behaviors of the group members in relation to the behaviors of other 
group members.
The subjects recalled a much higher proportion of items 
immediately than after Si hours. Furthermore, consistent with 
previously mentioned studies (e.g. Hastie and Kumar, 1979), 
incongruent items were better recalled than congruent Items, which 
in turn were better recalled than irrelevant items.
Srull (1981) had predicted that subjects would be more likely 
to Integrate discrepant pieces of information, and recall them 
better, if the pieces of information pertained to a psychologically 
meaningful target rather than if they did not. Consistent with this 
prediction, an equal proportion of items pertaining to a single
11
individual or meaningful group were recalled. These proportions of 
ltens recalled were each significantly greater than the proportion 
of iteas recalled about the noruneanlngful group. This suggests that 
people can process information about individuals or groups equally 
well if there is a psychologically meaningful reason to consider the 
group as a single unit.
It was also predicted that subjects would generally be more 
likely to Integrate various pieces of information, and thus develop 
interepisode associative linkages between ltens when they were 
attempting to form a coherent impression of the target than when 
they were simply trying to learn the material. In general, however, 
this Integration process should be more difficult for items 
incongruent with «* prior expectancy than for other items. Thus, 
these items would be expected to be kept In working memory for a 
longer period of time and form a greater number of associative links 
than other items. A number of findings are related to these 
hypotheses. First, more items were recalled under incidental 
(impression set) than intentional (memory set) learning conditions 
replicating earlier indications of such a possibility (Hyde and 
Jenkins, 1969; Handler, 1967). While there was no difference between 
the proportion of congruent or Irrelevant items recalled under 
memory set and impression set conditions, a significantly greater 
proportion of incongruent items was recalled under the impression 
set than under memory set conditions. This suggests that items 
incongruent with a prior expectancy undergo additional processing 
when subjects are attempting to form an integrated Impression of
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what the target would be like.
There was also a crossover interaction between learning 
conditions and length of delay. Instructions to fora an impression 
of the target person led to significantly greater recall than memory 
set instructions under Immediate delay conditions, but there was a 
nonsignificant advantage for memory set subjects in the long delay 
condition. This could have occurred because memory set subjects may 
have engaged in some additional rehearsal of the items since they 
knew they would later be asked to recall the items. Impression set 
subjects did not know they would have to recall the items and 
therefore would be unlikely to engage in such additional processing.
These results provide strong support for Hastie's model.
Several other results dealing with the order in which information is 
recalled were also found in this experiment.
According to Hastie's model, items that are congruent with a 
prior expectancy are encoded into memory by association with the 
abstract person node. However, when an incongruent item is encoded, 
it can be associated with other items as well as the abstract person 
node. These items can be congruent, irrelevant, or other Incongruent 
items. This implies that the probability of recalling an Incongruent 
item given that one has Just recalled a congruent item should be 
greater than the probability of recalling a congruent item given 
that one has Just recalled an incongruent item. This result was 
obtained in the experiment.
The probabilities concerning recall of Irrelevant items are 
also very interesting. The proportion of irrelevant items recalled
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was very low. However, when an Irrelevant Item was recalled the next 
item recalled was quite likely to be a congruent item. It may be 
that Irrelevant items are examined in relation to congruent items to 
"make sure” they could not be considered relevant during encoding, 
thus establishing some kind of interepisode path between irrelevant 
and congruent items. The problem with this explanation is that it 
assumes irrelevant items are held in working memory for a long 
period of time. If this was true, the proportion of irrelevant items 
recalled would be quite high instead of very low. Srull's 
explanation is that irrelevant items are not richly integrated into 
the network, and thus develop few if any Interitem associations. 
Thus, when an irrelevant item is recalled, the subject is forced to 
retreat to the general person node at the highest level of the 
hierarchy. If this is true, there should be a high probability of 
recalling congruent items on first attempts. This was, in fact, 
found. The explanation also accounts for the fact that fewer 
Irrelevant items than congruent or incongruent items were recalled.
To summarize Sruil's first experiment in this series, strong 
support for the superior recall of items incongruent with a prior 
expectancy over Items which are congruent with that expectancy was 
obtained. This was true when the set size for incongruent items was 
less than, equal to, or greater than that for congruent items, and 
the difference is Just as great after a delay of 48 hours as after a 
delay of a few minutes. Hastie's model predicted all the results 
except for the high probability of recalling a congruent item after 
recalling an irrelevant item.
The procedures of the second and third experiments were similar 
to that of the first. In experiment 2 the total number of congruent 
behaviors was held constant while the number of incongruent 
behaviors was varied and in experiment 3 the total number of 
Incongruent behaviors remained constant while the number of 
congruent behaviors was varied.
As in Experiment 1, a higher proportion of Incongruent items 
than congruent items were recalled. This was true when the set sizes 
were equal as well as when there were fewer Incongruent items. This 
replicates Hastle and Kumar (1979) and Experiment 1. It was also 
found that the proportion of congruent behaviors recalled increased 
simply as a function of the number of incongruent behaviors in the 
list.
In Experiment 3» varying the number of congruent and irrelevant 
behaviors had no effect on the number of incongruent behaviors 
recalled. Once again, the proportion of incongruent Items recalled 
was greater than that of other types of items regardless of the 
relative set sizes.
One important aspect of the Hastie model is the postulated 
formation of interepisode linkages between Incongruent and other 
types of items. Such paths are formed only when the subject compares 
two or more behavioral episodes in working memory. One implication 
of this is that any procedure that requires the subject to devote 
part or all of his/her processing capacity to an irrelevant task 
will effectively prevent the formation of such linkages. In 
Experiment 4 subjects rehearsed the items aloud as they were
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introduced. Four conditions were run: (1) no irrelevant task was 
required, (2) the subject was required to rehearse aloud the item 
presented one tine, (3) the subject was required to rehearse the 
iten two times, or (4) the subject was required to rehearse the iten 
three tines. Conditions 1-4 require more and more of the subjects' 
processing capacity to be devoted to an irrelevant task and thus 
should prevent the formation of interepisode associative links. As a 
consequence, it was predicted that the proportion of incongruent 
itens recalled would decline as the number of rehearsals increased.
As usual, incongruent items were best recalled and Irrelevant 
itens were worst recalled. Consistent with the predictions, the 
proportion of Incongruent behaviors recalled declined as the number 
of repetitions increased. The number of repetitions had no 
significant effect on the proportion of congruent or irrelevant 
items recalled.
These experiments are strong evidence for the superior recall 
of incongruent items over congruent items. Hastie's model is also 
supported. One problem, however, is that little of the research 
explored recall of irrelevant items which were generally used to 
control for list length effects. While it is clear that irrelevant 
items are not as well recalled as congruent or incongruent items, it 
is unclear how irrelevant items should be represented in an 
associative network. Consequently, Srull expanded Hastie's model to 
account for Irrelevant items.
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Srull*s Associative Network Model 
Srull (Srull, Lichtenstein, and Hothbart, 1984) was able to 
account for irrelevant items by changing one of the assumptions of 
the model (see Figure 2). According to Srull, subjects comprehend 
incongruent episodes by relating them to other behaviors that are 
relevant to the dimension in question. Specifically, subjects relate 
incongruent acts to congruent acts and to other Incongruent acts but 
not to behaviors that are irrelevant to the expectancy. This 
assumption is in contrast to the other model. Srull presents the 
following summary:
In sum, the theory suggests that irrelevant and congruent 
items are encoded by establishing associative linkages 
between any given episode and a higher order person node 
that represents the target who performed the act. 
Incongruent episodes also result in the establishment of 
such paths. In addition, however, such acts will often be 
thought of in relation to other relevant (l.e., congruent 
or incongruent) behaviors in an effort to more fully 
understand their implications. It should be noted that the 
tendency to maintain an item in working memory will be 
affected by a number of variables, the most important of 
which is the general "goal" or processing objective oi the 
subject. For example, a subject who is attempting to form 
a coherent Impression of the target will be utilizing a 
strong integration rule and will be quite likely to look 
for dependencies and interrelationships among the various 
behaviors. In contrast, a subject who is simply trying to 
remember the behaviors as well as possible may use a more 
rote rehearsal strategy in which such an Integration rule 
is much less likely to operate, (p.7)
Insert Figure 2 about here
When a subject attempts to recall the behavioral 
which was presented, the retrieval process underlying
information 
free recall is
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assumed to be the sane as that postulated by Anderson and Bower 
(1974). The search process starts at the person node at the highest 
level of the network and follows associative paths until an episode 
node is activated. After the subject recalls an episode, the search 
continues from that node to traverse the associative paths until 
another episode node is activated. When more than one path emanates 
from a particular node, the search is random and sequential. In 
other words, only one of several paths is chosen and this choice is 
random. This process continues to operate until the same episode 
node has been activated several times. This is the "clogging effect” 
in which the subject begins to retrieve repeatedly episodes that 
have already been reported to the experimenter. The subject 
interprets this as a signal that further retrieval will be difficult 
or impossible and terminates the search process.
Srull (Srull et al., 1984} performed a series of experiments to 
test this modified model. A number of predictions were made on the 
basis of this model of which the most obvious is that incongruent 
events should be remembered better than congruent events.
The design in the first experiment was a 2 x 4 completely 
balanced factorial with the following factors: learning conditions 
(memory set vs. anticipated Interaction set) and number of overt 
repetitions (0, 1, 2, or 3). The subjects in the memory set 
condition were told to remember the behavioral information as well 
as possible and that they would later be asked to recall Its basic 
content. The subjects in the anticipated interaction condition were 
told to form an impression of the target person because they would
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later meet hia. At that tine they would be asked to present 
arguments that vould be effective In changing the person's opinion 
about a controversial social issue.
The subjects were either (a) simply given the appropriate 
instructions, (b) given the instructions and told to rehearse aloud 
each item one time loud enough for the experimenter to hear it, (c) 
given the instructions and told to rehearse each Item aloud two 
times, or (d) given the instructions and told to rehearse each item 
aloud three times.
Several predictions were made and confirmed. Rehearsing the 
items should Interfere with the subject's ability to think about 
individual behaviors in relation to one another, and therefore the 
subjects should have more difficulty forming interepisode limes as 
the number of rehearsals increases. This should affect the 
proportion of incongruent items recalled to a large extent since it 
is the establishment of interepisode links between incongruent items 
with congruent items and other incongruent items that causes 
Incongruent Items to be recalled better than other items. Recall of 
congruent items should also be a 'feeted, but not as much as recall 
for Incongruent items. The reason for this is that superior recall 
of congruent items over irrelevant items is due, according to the 
modified theory, to interepisode links between incongruent and 
congruent items. When the formation of these links is interfered 
with, recall of congruent Items should decrease. Recall of 
irrelevant items should not be affected by rehearsal since 
irrelevant Items do not have any interepisode links to other items,
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and thus cannot be affected by interference with the formation of 
such links. The number of rehearsals should not affect memory set 
subjects in this way. Since subjects in this condition are not 
expected to attempt to integrate the information, the decrease in 
number of behaviors recalled should be approximately the same for 
each type of item.
Some correlational predictions were also made by Srull. He 
predicted that in the anticipated interaction condition, there would 
be a much higher correlation between the number of incongruent and 
the number of congruent items recalled than between the number of 
Incongruent and Irrelevant, or between the number of congruent and 
irrelevant items recalled. This would be true because irrelevant 
items are isolated in the network and not involved in the formation 
of interepisode associative paths. On the other hand, few 
interepisode paths are rcreed in the memory set condition, 
therefore, the three correlations mentioned should be approximately 
equal in this condition.
In Experiment 2, Srull involved the use of individual 
differences to examine the underlying assumptions of his model. The 
rationale is, if a model postulates a particular mechanism, skill, 
or theoretical process "that can be measured reliably outside of the 
situation for which it is serving its theoretical purpose" 
(Underwood, 1978), the model can then be used to predict differences 
in performance among individuals, as well as the more common use of 
predicting differences in performance across (experimental)
conditions.
The individual difference variable referred to as the "need for 
cognition" has been investigated over tha past thirty years. Cohan, 
Stotland, and dolfa (1955) described it as "a naad to structure 
ralavant situations in meaningful* intagrated ways, it is a naad to 
understand and sake reasonable tha experimental world" (p. 290- 
Srull describes it as referring "to an individual’s tendency to 
think about things In relationship to one another and atteapt to 
resolve any aabiguity that exists in a situation." (p. IS). Cacioppo 
and Petty (1982) have developed an eaplrlcaiiy-based assessment 
device of the construct that has psychometric properties.
Incongruent iteas are better recalled than other Items because 
there Is a higher probability that they will fora Interepisode paths 
with other lteas as a result of being retained longer in working 
memory. According to Srull, "this would suggest that individuals who 
characteristically are lore likely to think about events in 
relationship to one another will develop many more associative links 
between iteas than individuals who ordinarily are less likely to 
think about relationships between events" (p. 19)* Since Incongruent 
lteas fora sore links with other iteas than congruent or irrelevant 
lteas do, Srull predicted a strong, positive correlation between 
individual differences along the dimension and the number of 
incongruent iteas recalled. Since Irrelevant iteas are isolated In 
the network, it was predict. 1 that individual differences along the 
"need for cognition" dimension would not be a good predictor of the 
number of Irrelevant items retailed. It is important to note that 
these predictions are for subjects in an anticipated Interaction set
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The individual difference variable referred to as the Mneed for 
cognition1* has been investigated over the past thirty years. Cohen, 
Stotland, and Wolfe (1955) described it as "a need to structure 
relevant situations in meaningful, Integrated ways. It is a need to 
understand and make reasonable the experimental world" (p. 291)* 
Srull describes it as referring "to an individual's tendency to 
think about things in relationship to one another and attempt to 
resolve any ambiguity that exists In a situation." (p. 18). Cacloppo 
and Petty (1982) have developed an empirically-based assessment 
device of the construct that has psychometric properties.
Incongruent items are better recalled than other items because 
there is a higher probability that they will form interepisode paths 
with otHer items as a result of being retained longer in working 
memory. According to Srull, "this would suggest mmt individuals who 
characteristically are more likely to think about events in 
relationship to one another will develop «.any more associative links 
between items then individuals who ordinarily are less likely to 
think about relationships between events" (p. 19). Since incongruent 
items form more links with other Items than congruent or irrelevant 
items do, Srull predicted a strong, positive correlation between 
individual differences along the dimension and the number of 
incongruent items recalled. Since irrelevant items are isolated in 
the network, it was predicted that individual differences along the 
"need for cognition" dimension would not be a good predictor of the 
number of irrelevant items recalled. It is Important to note that 
these predictions are for subjects in an anticipated interaction set
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that was described in Experiment 1 and was used in this experiment 
for ail the subjects.
An important assumption of the theory is that irrelevant items 
are completely isolated in the network and do not have any 
interepisode paths connecting them to other items. Experiment 3 
tests this assumption by adding incongruent items to the list. Srull 
(1981) has previously shown that Incongruent items form associative 
links with other incongruent items and congruent items. But, in 
order to keep total list length constant, the number of incongruent 
and irrelevant items were confounded. Srull*s model predicts that 
when the confound is eliminated, adding incongruent items to the 
list should increase the proportion of congruent items recalled but 
have no effect on the proportion of Irrelevant items recalled. All 
of these predictions were confirmed in the experiment.
The final experiment in the series explored the order in which 
items were recalled and the time between the recall of an item and 
the one after it. since irrelevant items are Isolated in the 
network, Srull predicted that during retrieval, subjects would have 
to retreat to the person node at the highest level of the hierarchy 
after recalling an Irrelevant item. Therefore, a high probability of 
recalling a congruent item after an Irrelevant item should result 
since the superordinate cues embedded in the initial expectancy are 
very likely to elicit the retrieval of a congruent episode. This 
also means that the first item recalled has a high probability of 
being a congruent Item. Also, it should take longer to retrieve the 
next item after an irrelevant item than after a congruent or
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incongruent item since more paths must he traversed. Finally, 
interresponse times preceding the recall of irrelevant items should 
be longer than those for congrent or incongruent items for the same 
reason and these predictions were confirmed in the experiment.
Situation-Specific Expectancies
In general, these data support Srull's model. However, all the 
expectancies which have been used in experiments to support the 
model have been general expectancies. In real life, we often gain an 
expectancy about a target person in a particular situation. For 
example, a student may gain an expectancy that a particular teacher 
is unkind as a result of the student's failure to obtain a passing 
grade. This student may not necessarily think that the teacher is 
unkind at home with the rest of the family. If the student's 
expectancy does not generalise from a school situation to a home 
situation, there will be no "home" expectancy and consequently, no 
congruent or Incongruent Items. Thus, If the student observes the 
teacher In a home situation, the student may not be able to recall 
incongruent (kind) behaviors better than congruent (unkind) 
behaviors as the model predicts. In fact, there may be an equal 
probability of recalling the different kinds of behaviors.
In sum, people can obtain expectancies about other people in 
the context of a specific situation. If these expectancies 
generalize, Srull's model should accurately predict the relative 
amounts of different types of information which should be recalled 
even If the expectancy was obtained In a specific situation.
However, the model should make Inaccurate predictions if such
23
expectancies are situation-specific and do not generalize.
Therefore, the purpose of this experiment is to see whether 
expectancies are situation-specific and to adjust the model 
accordingly.
Method
Subjects. Seventy-two male and female introductory psychology 
students participated in the experiment. Participation partially 
fulfilled a course requirement.
Materials. Thirty-six behavior statements were used. Half of 
these statements dealt with a target person's (Joe) behavior at home 
and the rest dealt with Joe's behavior at work. Each group of 
behavior statements was divided into three subgroups of six kind 
behavlorsf six unkind behaviors, and six irrelevant behaviors. These 
thirty-six behavior statements were chosen from a set of forty-eight 
behavior statements on the basis of subjects' ratings of the degree 
of congruency, incongruency, or irrelevancy of the statements in a 
preliminary study.
Design. The experimental design was a 2 x 6 x 6 mixed factorial 
with two between-subject factors and one within-subject factor. The 
between-subject factors were the type of orienting task (memory set 
vs. impression set) and the type of expectancy (home-kind vs. 
home-unkind vs. work-kind vs. work-unkind vs. general-kind vs. 
general-unkind). The within-subject factor was item type (home-kind 
vs. home-unkind vs. home-irrelevant vs. work-kind vs. work-unkind 
vs. work-irrelevant). The expectancy factor refers to whether the 
target person was kind or unkind at home or work when the expectancy
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was formed. Also, there is a general expectancy condition in which 
the expectancy is not situation-specific. The item type factor 
refers to the actual behavior statements that were used. For 
example, the statement, "Joe yelled at the secretary for making the 
coffee too strong," is incongruent with the expectancy that Joe is 
kind at work.
Procedure. The subjects in the memory set condition were 
instructed to remember the behavioral information as well as 
possible and told that they would later be asked to recall its basic 
content. The subjects in the impression set condition were told to 
form an impression of what the target person was like and that they 
would later be asked to make some simple judgements about that 
person. Each expectancy (kind or unkind) was situation-specific 
depending on condition. For example, subjects in the "at home" 
condition were told that the target person was described by his 
family as being kind and friendly. The subjects in the general 
expectancy condition were given an expectancy that was not 
situation-specific•
All the subjects were run through the experiment in groups of
five and they were paced through the thirty-six items at a rate of
five seconds per item. All of the subjects were given a delay of
five minutes (they wrote down the names of the states in America)
before being asked to recall the items. This manipulation was used 
to eliminate any recency effects. The items recalled were written by 
the subjects and scored later by a "lenient" criterion. In other 
words the subjects only had to recall the basic content of the
items.
Results
Free Recall
The free-recall data were scored according to a lenient 
"general meaning" criterion by a judge blind to all experimental 
conditions. Previous research has indicated that this procedure can 
be used with near perfect reliability (Srull, 1981; Srull and Brand 
1983). Also comparable to other studies that have used behavioral 
items (Hastle and Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1983; Srull et al.f 1984), an 
extremely small number of intrusions was found in the present data 
set.
The total number of items recalled was analyzed as a function 
of two between-subject and one within-subject factors. The 
between-subject factors were the type of orienting task (memory set 
vs. impression set) and the type of expectancy (home-kind vs. 
home-unkind vs. work-kind vs. work-unkind vs. general-kind vs. 
general-unkind). The wlthin-subject factor was item type (home-kind 
vs. home-unkind vs. home-irrelevant vs. work-kind vs. work-unkind 
vs. work-irrelevant). Thus, for purposes of analysis the design was 
considered a 2 x 6 x 6 mixed factorial with six subjects randomly 
assigned to each cell.
The main effect of orienting task was not significant, F (1, 
360) = 1.53* £ > 0.20, nor did this variable enter into ary 
Interactions. The mean number of home-kind, home-unkind, 
home-irreleventt work-kind, work-unkind, and work-irrelevant items 
recalled are presented in Table 1 as a function of the expectancy
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condition.
Insert Table 1 about here
There was a significant main effect of Item type, F (5» 360) = 
41.48, g < 0.001, but this was qualified by an important interaction 
between item type and the expectancy condition, F (25• 360) = 14.23, 
g < 0.001. Since there are six levels associated with each of these 
variables, the nature of this interaction is best understood by 
examining how the pattern of recall associated with each item type 
changes across the various expectancy conditions.
Figure 3 presents the mean number of home-kind, home-unkind, 
home-irrelevant, work-kind, work-unkind, and work-irrelevant items 
recalled as a function of the two "home” expectancy conditions.
There are a number of things to note about these data. Under the 
home-kind expectancy condition, subjects recalled a greater number 
of home-unkind than home-kind items, and a greater number of 
home-kind than home-Irrelevant items. Post-hoc significance tests 
using Newman-Keuls procedures indicate that each difference is 
significant at g < 0.01. In contrast, under the home-unkind 
expectancy condition, subjects recalled more of the "incongruent" 
home-kind than "congruent” home-unkind items ( g < 0.01), and more 
of the home-unkind than home-irrelevant items ( g < 0.01). This 
pattern of results essentially replicates findings previously 
reported by Srull (1981; Srull et al., 1984). Incongruent items are 
best recalled and irrelevant items are most poorly recalled.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
The recall levels associated with the various "work" items are 
also interesting. There is no difference In the recall probabilities 
associated with these items as a function of whether they are kind, 
unkind, or irrelevant and these levels of recall do not change as a 
function of the expectancy condition. These data indicate that the 
initial expectancy is clearly situation-specific. As such, the data 
are inconsistent with models which suggest that such "incongruity 
effects" are simply due to an evaluative Inconsistency between the 
item and the espectancy (Wyer and Gordon, 1982). If this were true* 
the kind and unkind items should show the same pattern regardless of 
whether they are associated with home or work. In terms of 
associative network theory, these data would suggest that 
home-irrelevant items become isolated in the final representational 
structure, and this accounts for why they are so poorly recalled 
relative to the other "relevant" (i.e., home-kind or home-unkind) 
items. In contrast, the "work" items appear to form a relatively 
undifferentiated network, and thus their recall does not vary as a 
function of whether they are kind, unkind, or irrelevant (see Srull 
et al., 1984 for an explication of how this might occur).
Figure 4 presents the mean number of home-kind, home-unkind, 
home-irrelevant, work-kind, work-unkind, and work-irrelevant items 
recalled as a function of the two "work" expectancy conditions. For 
the most part, this is the mirror image of the previous figure.
28
Under the work-kind expectancy condition, the work-unkind items are 
recalled better than the work-kind items ( g < 0.01), and these in
turn are better recalled than the work-irrelevant items { g> < 0.01).
Under the work-unkind expectancy condition, the work-kind items are 
better recalled than the work-unkind items ( g < 0.01), and these in
turn are better recalled than the work-irrelevant items ( g < 0.01).
As before, there are no significant differences among the "home” 
items, either as a function of evaluative tone or as a function of 
the expectancy condition. Thus, again there is a clear 
situation-specific expectancy effect, with incongruent items best 
recalled and Irrelevant items most poorly recalled.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Figure 5 shows data relevant to the "general” expectancy 
conditions. Under these conditions, a quite different pattern 
emerges. In particular, subjects receiving both the general-kind and 
general-unkind expectancy show better recall of Incongruent than 
congruent items, and better recall of the congruent than Irrelevant 
items (all differences are significant at least at g < 0.05). This 
i* true regardless of whether the items pertain to home or work. 
These data extend the findings previously reported by Srull (1981; 
Srull et al., 1984) and Hastie (1984) by showing that incongruity 
effects will not only be obtained for behaviors pertaining to a 
single trait dimension, but also for behaviors performed in 
distinctly different situational contexts. On the other hand, this
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requires that the Initial expectancy be a general one rather than 
situation-specific in nature.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Ratinis of thf Target Person
Based on normative datd reported by Srgil and Wyer (1979,
19*0), tte trails kindi considerate, thoughtful, hostile, 
wmf*twdiy, and disiuable were assumed to be 4»flafcaMvfly related 
to the trait dimension of kind. Rating* on these limits were
summed Ui'ter appropriate reverse sunring) to provide a 
single index of the target1* perntivei1 kihdheas, Six other traits, 
borimf, selfish, narrow-* ilfcltd* dependable, interesting, and 
intelligent were fsawnd bp Smill and Iyer (1919, 1980) to be 
evaluative!? loaded Put descriptively unrelated to kindness. Ratings 
along these dlseitsioos were therefore summed (after appropriate 
reverse scoring) to provide a single index of global evaluation.
Table 2 presents the mean ratings of the target along 
kindness-related dimensions as a function of orienting task and type 
of expectancy. Comparable ratings for the evaluativeiy similar 
dimensions are presented in Table 3* Statistical analyses indicate 
that there are no significant differences in either case. Treating 
type of Judgement as a within-subject variable also produced no 
difference. Thus, denotatively-related and evaluatively-related 
dimensions el i i ted the same type of ratings.
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Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
Discussion
The data which have been obtained clearly indicate that 
expectancies can be situation-specific or general. Previous models 
(e.g. Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Srull et al., 1984) can explain 
lneeftgrutncy effects only when the expectancy is a general one. When 
the expectancy is situation-specific in nature, these models are 
inadequate, thus indicating a need for some refinements in working 
toward a complete model of person memory.
The Srull model explains incongruity effects by assuming that 
incongruent items are compared with other relevant (congruent or 
incomgruent) items, thereby resulting in an elaborate associative 
network. However, the present research suggests some constraints on 
this assumption. It Is clear that social expectancies will often be 
general ones; but, as the results of the present study indicate, 
they can also be situation-specific. If the expectancy is 
situation-specific, the items must be congruent or incongruent to a 
situation which is relevant to the expectancy for incongruity 
effects to occur. Since situation-specific expectancies do not 
generalize to other situations, behaviors not occuring in the 
expectancy-relevant situation are neither congruent, incongruent, 
nor irrelevant to the expectancy. Consequently, there is no reason 
for people to compare these items to each other as the previous 
associative network theories suggest. For example, consider a
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subject who gains an expectancy that a target person is kind at 
work, if tfti subject is give#* a iiet of the target person's 
behaviors at work, the subject will probably organize the behaviors 
into 4h associative network of the type proposed by Srull (Srull et 
al., 198M) * However, a similar list of behaviors which the target 
performed at home, will elicit an undifferentiated recall pattern 
with respect to congruency, incongruency, and irrelevancy, thus 
indicating that inter-item associative links are not being formed.
In sum, a new associative network model is proposed to take 
situation-specific expectancies into account (see Figure 6). If some 
of the behaviors are performed In the expectancy-relevant situation 
and the other items are relevant to another situation, the following 
associative links should be established. Associative links between a 
higher order person node (representing the target) and the situation 
nodes are established. In addition, item nodes are linked to 
situation nodes if the items are relevant to the situation (e.g. 
"work" items get linked to a "work" situation node), inter-item 
associative links are formed between items which are relevant to the 
expectancy and the situation to which the expectancy refers. On the 
other hand, few inter-item associative links fora between the Items 
which occurred in the other situation. Thus, the item nodes which 
are connected to the expectancy-relevant situation node form an 
associative network with many Inter-item associations; while the 
item nodes connected to the other situation node form a relatively 
undifferentiated network. The major factor, then, in determining 
which item nodes will have inter-item associative links connected to
32
then, is whether the situation in which these behaviors occurred 
happens to be the one specified by the expectancy.
Insert Figure 6 about here
tyhlle it is clear how situation-specific expectancies should be 
represented in a associative network aodel, the representation of 
general expectancies poses an interesting challenge. At least two 
representations seen to account equally well for the present data*
In principle, however, these models are enpirlcally distinguishable 
froa each other. The first of these nodels Is stellar to the one 
proposed by Srull (Sruil et al., 1984). Each itea node Is linked to 
a higher order person node, and inter-itea associations are aade 
according to the consistency, inconsistency, or irrelevancy of the 
itea* Pole that no situation nodes are postulated in this particular 
aodel (see Figure 7).
Insert Figure 7 about here
The second possible general expectancy representation 
postulates the existence of situation nodes such that associative 
links connect then to a higher order person node. In addition, itea 
nodes are linked to situation nodes if the items are relevant to the 
situation (e.g. "home” iteas are linked to a "home” situation node). 
Inter-itea associations are formed between items which occurred in a 
particular situation, but not between items which occurred in
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different situations. Thus, the first model postulates Inter-1ten 
associative links between itens regardless of the situation in which 
the behaviors occurred; while according to the second nodal! these 
inter-iten associations forn only when the items occur in the sane 
situation (see Figure 8).
Insert Figure 8 about here
The above general expectancy models can be tested in at least 
three different ways. The second nodel predicts that the itens 
recalled will be clustered by situation, while the first model does 
not. Conditional probabilities can also be used to test the models. 
The first nodel predicts that the probability of recalling an 
Incongruent work item after recalling an incongruent hone itea is 
the sane as the probability of recalling an Incongruent hone Itea 
after recalling another incongruent home item. On the other hand, 
the second nodel does not postulate the formation of inter-iten 
associative links between itens which occurred In different 
situations, and thus makes different predictions. Specifically, this 
nodel predicts that ' ie probability of recalling an Incongruent hone 
lten after recalling another incongruent hone item is greater than 
the probability of recalling an incongruent wprk item after 
recalling an incongruent home item.
Another way of testing these models is to measure the time it 
takes to recall a particular kind of Item given that another kind of 
itea was previously recalled. The first model predicts that the time
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it takes to recall an incongruent hose itea given that another 
incongruent home itea was previously recalled should be the saae as 
the tiae it takes to recall an Incongruent work itea after recalling 
an incongruent hoae itea. According to the second aodel, to recall 
an incongruent work itea given that an incongruent home item was 
previously recalled, the subject must traverse the associative 
network starting from the incongruent hoae itea node and finishing 
on the incongruent work item node. En route, the subject must go up 
to the higher order person node via the hoae situation node, and 
then down to the incongruent work item node via the work situation 
node. Thus, many paths must be traversed and the interresponse time 
should be large. This is not true when going from one Incongruent 
hoae node to another. Therefore, the interresponse time between the 
recall of two incongruent hone items should be less than the 
interresponse time between the recall of an incongruent hoae item 
and an incongruent work itea.
The saae data which Indicate that expectancies may be 
situation-specific, are also Inconsistent with models (e.g. Wyer and 
Gordon, !962) which suggest that incongruity effects are simply due 
to an evaluative inconsistency between the behavior and the 
expectancy. If such models were true, recall data obtained from 
subjects who were given "work11 expectancies would have shown the 
same incongruity effects for "hoae" items as for "work" items. 
Conversely, data from subjects who recleved a "home" expectancy 
would have shown incongruity effects for "work" items as well as for 
"home1* items. Since these effects were only elicited from items
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which occurred in the expectancy-relevant situation, evaluative 
inconsistency is probably not the only important factor in the 
production of incongruity effects. It appears that some kind of 
descriptive consistency is necessary for incongruity effects to 
occur. For this experiment, the descriptive consistency Is simply 
that the expectancy and the items had a particular situation (e.g. 
"at work” or "at home") in common. However, subsequent research 
should examine the precise boundary conditions under which 
descriptive consistency or inconsistency is likely to play an 
Important role.
Previous researchers (Hastle and Kumar, 1979; Srull et al., 
1984) have found that subjects differentially recall congruent, 
incongruent, and Irrelevant items under Impression set conditions, 
but not under memory set conditions. The usual explanation is that 
memory set subjects do not attempt to integrate the information, and 
therefore do not form inter-item associative links between the 
episodes.
In this experiment, however, the data from the memory set 
subjects was similar to the data from the subjects in the impression 
set condition. This was true with respect to both the overall levels 
of recall and the likelihood of recalling congruent, incongruent, 
and Irrelevant items. There are, of course, many possible reasons 
for this. The simplest explanation, however, is that memory set 
subjects tried to form an impression of the target person even 
though they were not told to do so. This explanation may also 
account for the lack of effects in the Judgement data between memory
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set and impression set subjects.
One finding which is particularly interesting! is that recall 
had no effect on Judgements. This finding is consistent with past 
research (Lichtenstein and Srull, in press; Srull Mid gyer, 1$8)1 
which indicates that there is no correspondence between recall and 
judgement under impression set conditions. In fact, it is often 
found that judgments are a function of what is presented, not what 
is recalled (see e.g., (fastis and Kumar, 1979). Since the same items 
were presented to ail subjects, one might not expect to find any 
differences, if memory set subjects were indeed forming Impressions, 
then the sane Judgemer t patterns nouid hold for both memory and 
impression set subjects. Since this is what happened, it seems 
likely that memory met subjects did attempt to form impressions and 
that recall does not effect judgements under impression set 
conditions.
Conclusion
Expectancies have been found to be general or 
situation-specific and a model of person memory hss been proposed to
account for this finding. The model, although it accounts for much 
more data, is similar to other models of person memory (e.g. Hastie 
and Kumar, 1979; Srull et al., 198*). While the model makes a new 
assumption about encoding, given a situation-specific expectancy, 
the fundamental assumptions about storage and retrieval are the same 
as those in other models. These other models have had a high degree 
of heuristic value and have generate a great deal of research. It
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is hoped that the model proposed In the present paper will be 
equally successful in stimulating researchers to investigate the 
many unresolved issues that remain In the area of memory and social 
Judgement. Many pieces of the puzzle have already been discovered. 
Carefully grooming the edges, as well as fitting the pieces 
together, will provide a major challenge to future investigators.
38
References
Anderson, J.R., and Bo**er, G.H. (1974). A propositional theory of 
recognition. Memory and Recognition. 2, 406-412.
Anderson, C., and Hastie, R. (1980). Effects of retention interval on 
recall of information about people, in R. Hastie, T.M. Ostrom, 
E.B. Ebbesen, R. S. Wyer, D.l. Hamilton, and D.E. Carlston 
(Eds.), Person Memory. Hlllscule N.J.: Erlbaum.
Bartlett, P.C. (1932). Rem. .»o*rlng: A Study in Experimental and Social 
Psychology. Cambridge, L nr. land: Cambridge University Press.
Cacioppo, J.T., and Petty, R.E. (1982). The need for cognition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116-131.
Cohen, A.R., Stotland, E., and Wolfe, D.H. (1955). An experimental 
investigation of need for cognition. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, §|, 291-294.
Hastie, R. (1981). Schematic principles in human memory. In E.T. 
Higgins, C.P. Herman, and M.P. Zanna (Eds.), Social Cognition:
The Ontario syposlum on personality and social psychology. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Hastie, R. (1984). Causes and effects of causal attribution. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 44-56.
Hastie, R., and Kumar, P.A. (1979). Person memory: Personality traits 
as organizing principles in memory for behaviors. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 32» 25-38.
Hastie, R., and Mazur, J. (1980). Merory for information about people 
presented on film. In R. Hastie, T.M. Ostrom, E.B. Ebbesen, R.S.
39
Wyer, D.L. Hamilton, and D.£. Carl*ton (£ds.)f Person Memory.
Hi1lsdale, H. J .: Er1baum.
Hyde, T.S., and Jenkins, J.J. (1969). Differential effects of 
incidental tasks on the organization of a list of highly 
associated words. Journal of Exper inerts1 Psychology, 82,
472-482.
Lichtenstein, M., and Sruii, T.K. (in press). Conceptual and
methodological issues in examining the relationship between 
consumer memory and judgement. In L.f. Alwlfct and A.A, Mitchell 
(ids.), Psychological processes in advertising effects: Theory, 
research, and application. Hillsdale, H.J.: Erlbaum.
Handler,G. (1967). Organization and memory. In K.W. Spence and J.A. 
Spence (Eds.), The psychology of learning and motivation (vol 1). 
Mew fork: Academic Press.
Srull, T.K. (1fH). Person memory: Some tests of associative s storage 
and retrieval models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 7 , 1157-1170.
Srull, T.K., and Brand, J.F. (1983). Memory for information about 
persons: The effect of encoding operations on subsequent 
retrieval. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 
219*230.
Srull, T.K., Lichtenstein, M., and Rothbart, M. (1984). Associative 
storage and retrieval processes in person memory. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Illinois.
Srull, ,.K. and Wyer, R.S. (1979). The role of category accessibility 
in the interpretation of information about persons: Some
mdeterminants and implications. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, £7, 1660-1672.
Srull, T.K. and Wyer, R.S. (1980). Category accessibility and social 
perception: Some implications for the study of person memory and 
interpersonal judgement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 3 8 , 8K1-856.
Sruli, T.K. and Wyer, R.S. ( 1 9 8 3 ). The role of control processes and 
structural constraints in models of memory and social judgement. 
Journal §f Experimental Social Psychology, J9, 497-521.
Underwood, G. (1911). Strategies of Information Processing. London: 
Academic Press.
Wyer, R.S., and Gordon, S.E. (1982). The recall of information about 
persons ana groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psy.hology,
T ab It 1
Hean Number of Each Item Type Recalled 
aa a Function of Type of Expectancy
Hone- Hone- Wora- Work- General- General
Type of Iten Kind Unkind Kind Unkind Kind Unkind
Hone-
Kind 2.1? 4.25 2.25 1.75 2.00 3.92
Rome*
Unkind 4.17 1.75 2.00 1.67 4.00 1.92
Rone-
Irrelevant .063 0.92 2.08 1.75 0.92 0,83
Work-
Kind 1.92 2.00 2.00 4.00 1.42 4.00
Work*
Unkind 1.83 2.00 4.17 2.00 3.08 2.00
Work-
Irrelevant 1.83 1.92 1.08 0.75 0.75 1.06
Tftblt 2
Moon anting* of the Torgtt Along Dinenoiono 
Denotatively Belated to Kindne** m  a 
Function of Orienting Took and 
Typo of Expectancy
Orientirat Took
Piyctucj B S S S S I M InrtAAioa Sot
Hone-Cind 4.67 3*63
Hone-Unkind 3.67 4*50
Work-Kind 4.34 3.50
Work-Unkind 4.63 4.34
General-Kind 3.67 4.17
General-Unkind 3.50 4.34
table 5
Wsan Ratings of tho Target Along Dimensions 
KraiuAtirely Related to Kindness aa a 
Function of Orienting Task 
and Type of Expectancy
Orienting Task
Expectancy Memory Set Impression Set
Home-Kind 4*00 4.17
Home-Unkind 3.67 3.83
Work H U  nd 4.17 4.33
Work-Unkind 3.83 4.00
General-Kind 3.67 3.33
General-Unkind 4.67 3.50
Figure Captions
Figure 1. An associative network model of person memory 
by Hastie.
Figure 2 . An associative network model of person memory 
oy Srull.
•glgure 3. The mean number of home-kind, home-unkind, 
home-irrelevant, work-kind, work-unkind, and work-irrelevant 
items recalled as a function of the two "home” expectancy 
conditions.
Figure 4. The mean number oi home-Kind, home-unkind, 
nome-irrelevant, work-kind, work-urucind, and work-irrelevant 
items recalled as a function of the two "work” expectancy 
conditions.
Figure 5. The mean number of home-kind, home-unk;nd, 
home-irrelevant, work-kind, work-unkind, and work-irrelevant 
items recalled as a function of the two "general" expectancy 
conditions.
Figure 6. An associative network model of person memory 
for an expectancy that the target person is kind at home. 
Figure 7. An associative network model of person memory 
for a general expectancy that the target person is kind 
(first general expectancy model).
Figure Captions
Figure 8. An associative network model of person memory 
for a general expectancy that the target person is kind 
(second general expectancy model).
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Appendix A
The
oritained
instructions that the subjects were given were 
in Appendix A, There were six impression set
nstmictions and six memory set instructions
Impression Set Condition
One of the things that psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological 
processes and the experiment you will participate in today 
is concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. People in Joe's family describe Joe as 
being much more kind and friendly than the average person. 
He tends to do nice things for people and behave in a 
generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented, you 
will be asked several questions about your impression 
of Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds.
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a second
time.
Impression Set Cor*dition
One of the things that psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological proces­
ses and the experiment you will participate in today is 
concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. People in Joe's family describe Joe as 
being much more unkind and unfriendly than the average 
person. He tends not to do nice things for people and 
behave in a generally unkind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented, 
you will be asked several questions about your impression 
of Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
Impression Set Condition
One of the things that psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological proces­
ses and the experiment you will participate in today is 
concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
£ach of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. The people who Joe works with describe Joe 
as being much more kind and friendly than the average 
person. He tends to do nice things for people and behave 
in a generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented# you 
will be asked several questions about your impression of 
Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval# the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented# you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
Impression Set Condition
One of the things that psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological proces­
ses and the experiment you will participate in today is 
concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. The people who Joe works with describe Joe 
as being much more unkind and unfriendly than the average 
person. He tends not to do nice things for people and 
behave in a generally unkind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented, 
you will be asked several questions about your impression 
of Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
Impression Set Condition
One of the things that psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about differ­
ent types of people. This involves many psychological 
processes and the experiment you will participate in 
today is concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. Joe tends to be much more kind and 
friendly than the average person. He tends to do nice 
things for people and behave in a generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented, you 
will be asked several questions about your impression of 
Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
Impression Set Condition
One of the things that psychologists are inter­
ested in is the way in which we observe and think about 
different types of people. This involves many psycho­
logical processes and the experiment you will participate 
in today is concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. Joe tends to be much more unkind and un­
friendly than the average person. He tends not to do nice 
things for people and behave in a generally unkind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to form a coherent impression of what Joe 
would be like. After this list has been presented, you 
will be asked several questions about your impression of 
Joe.
One behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
Alter each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, 
you will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
Memory Set Condition
One of the things psychologists are interested in 
is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological 
processes and the experiment you will participate in 
today is concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. People in Joe’s family describe Joe as 
being much more kind and friendly than the average person 
He tends to do nice things for people and behave in a 
generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to remember them as well as possible. You 
need not remember the exact words, but after the list 
has been presented, you will be asked to recall each of 
the 30 behaviors in your own words.
Each behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented, you 
will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a
second time.
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One of the things psychologists are interested in 
is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological proces­
ses and the experiment you will participate in today is 
concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. The people who Joe works with describe Joe 
as being much more kind and friendly than the average 
person. He tends to do nice things for people and behave 
in a generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to remember them as well as possible. You 
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Memory Set Condition
One of the things psychologists are interested in 
is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological 
processes and the experiment you will participate in 
today is concerned with several of these.
you will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. The people who Joe works with describe 
Joe as being much more unkind and unfriendly than the 
average person. He tends not to do nice things for 
people and behave in a generally unkind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to remember them as well as possible. You 
need not remember the exact words, but after the list 
has been presented, you will be asked to recall each of 
the 30 behaviors in your own words.
Each behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. Mien the entire list has been presented, 
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Memory Set Condition
One of the things psychologists are interested 
in is the way in which we observe and think about 
different types of people. This involves many 
psychological processes and the experiment you will 
participate in today is concerned with several of 
these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. Joe tends to be much more kind and 
friendly than the average person. He tends to do nice 
things for people and behave in a generally kind manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to remember them as well as possible.
You need not remember the exact words# but after the 
list has been presented# you will be asked to recall 
each of the 30 behaviors in your own words.
Each behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval# the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented# 
you will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a 
second time.
Memory Set Condition
One of the things psychologists are interested in 
is the way in which we observe and think about different 
types of people. This involves many psychological 
processes and the experiment you will participate in 
today is concerned with several of these.
You will be presented with a list of 30 behaviors. 
Each of these behaviors was performed by a person named 
Joe Harrison. Joe tends to be much more unkind and 
unfriendly than the average person. He tends not to do 
nice things for people and behave in a generally unkind 
manner.
Your task is to listen to a list of 30 behaviors 
and attempt to remember then as well as possible. You 
need not remember the exact words# but after the list has 
been presented# you will be asked to recall each of the 
30 behaviors in your own words.
Each behavior will be presented every 6 seconds. 
After each 6 second interval, the next behavior will be 
presented. When the entire list has been presented# 
you will not be permitted to hear about the behaviors a 
second time.
Appendix B
The items that the subjects were given are contained 
in Appendix B.
Behavioral Items
1, Joe yelled at the secretary because the coffee was too 
strong.
2. Joe listened to Mozart*a clarinet concerto because it 
was his favorite record.
3* Joe served the whole family breakfast in bed to show how 
how much he appreciated them.
4. Joe watched the soccer game on T.V.
5. Joe gave flowers to the typist.
6. Joe hit his wife because she bought a new dress.
7. Joe kicked his crippled mother out of the house.
6. Joe read Hamlet because he liked English plays.
9. Joe spanked his son for talking loudly.
10. Joe took his daughter to see Swan Lake despite the fact 
that he hated ballet.
11. Joe sat on the couch to relax.
12. Joe hit one of his assistants for making a mistake.
13. Joe told his daughter that she couldn’t leave the house 
until she cooked him a three course meal*
14. Joe played football with his son even though he waa very 
tired.
1 %  Joe told hie co-worker not to worry about his mistake.
16, Joe shut the kitchen window because it was cold outside.
17. Joe exhaled smoke from his cigar into the face of one 
of his competitors at a meeting,
18, Joe wore blue pants in his office,
19* Joe invited his lonely mother to stay with him instead 
of going to :*Xirope as he had planned.
20. Joe gave Mrs. Jisher the day off so she could visit her a 
aunt.
21. Joe left his briefcase on a chair in his office.
22. Joe gave an unemployed person a job as a stockboy despite 
having too many stockboys.
23* Joe yelled at his wife because she forgot to dust his 
trophy*
24* Joe took his son's class to the baseball game and bought 
them hot dogs*
29* Joe threatened to shoot the client if he ever came in 
again without an appointment,
26* Joe bought a toy for his secretary's son for his birthday*
27* Joe threw his pen into the garbage can because it ran 
out of ink*
28* Joe looked at the sign across the street from hi* Office*
29* Joe dropped his notebook on the floor of his office*
JO. Joe kicked an assistant in the leg to make her move faster*
Appendix C
The judgement questionaire which the subjects received 
is contained in Appendix C.
N a m e _______ _______________
As a final task, we would like to get your impressions 
of Joe by having you rate him along the dimensions listed 
below. Make your ratings along a scale from 0 (not at all) 
to 10 (extremely) toe each item.
1. How LIKEABLE would you rate Joe? . . . . . . . . .
2. How UNFR-ENLLY would you rate Joe? ..................
3. How INCONSIDERATE would you rate J o e ? . . . . . . .
4. How KIND would you rate J o e ? .......... ..
5. How THOUGHTFUL would you rate Joe? . , .............
6. How HOSTILE would you rate Joe?. .....................
7. How BORING would you rate Joe? .......................
8. How DEPENDABLE would you rate Joe? . . .  ..........
How INTERESTING would you rate Joe?. . . . . . . .
10. How NARROW-MINDED would you rate J o e ? ............. ..
11. How SELFISH would you rate J o e ? ............. ..
12. How INTELLIGENT would you rate Joe?. . .............
Appendix D
The debriefing statement is contained in Appendix D.
Debriefing
You have just participated in an experiment in social psycho­
logy. One of the things that social psychologists are interested 
in is how our perceptions of other people are influenced by our 
prior impressions of them.
In the present experiment# we were concerned with two specifi 
issues. First, is memory for events that are consistent with our 
prior impressions better or worse than events that are consistent 
with such impressions? You may have noticed that some of the 
behaviors in the list were inconsistent with what you were 
originally led to expect.
The second question concerns whether we form single 
impressions or ’’mental representations” of other people, or 
whether our impressions are more situation specific. For 
example, is it possible to have one impression of how someone acts 
at work, and another for how thev act at home? The present 
experiment should help us understand the psychological processes 
that are involved in forming such impressions in much greater 
detail.
if you would like to learn more about these issues, the 
following book, which is in the university library, will be very 
useful:
Hastie, R. et al. (eds.) Person memory. Hillsdale, N.J.:
Erlbaum, 1980.
If you have any questions, or would like :o discuss the 
experiment in more detail, feel ft e to contact Dr. Thomas K.
Srull in Room 413.
